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Hard  economic  times  are  prompting 
folks  in  all  sectors  of  the  economy 
to cinch their belts an extra notch or 
two.  Households are driving less and 
shopping  the  bargain  aisles,  while 
businesses  are  scotching  expansion 
plans  and  even  paring  back  exist-
ing workforces.  State and local gov-
ernments are feeling the pinch, too.   
They’re  trimming  budgets,  mulling 
tax hikes and looking for novel ways 
to  economize  on  service  provision.   
Regional  consolidation  is  one  such 
innovative  idea,  but  can  it  actually 
deliver the promised cost savings that 
its proponents claim?
	 New	Jersey’s	Governor	Jon	Corzine	
made	 headlines	 recently	 with	 an	 all-
stick,	 no-carrot	 plan	 to	 reduce	 state	
spending	 and	 prod	 localities	 into	
operating	 more	 efficiently.	 	 Corzine	
has	proposed	eliminating	state	aid	to	
towns	with	fewer	than	5,000	residents	
and	 halving	 support	 to	 municipali-
ties	 with	 populations	 below	 10,000.	 	
Small	municipalities	could	dodge	the	
revenue-cutting	 axe	 by	 merging	 with	
other	jurisdictions	or	sharing	services,	
under	the	presumption	that	these	big-




towns,	 spread	 out	 over	 4,800	 square	
miles,	pale	beside	the	21	counties	over-
lapping	 566	 cities,	 towns,	 boroughs,	
villages,	and	townships	that	New	Jersey	
has	 carved	 out	 for	 itself	 from	 just	 a	












is	 ambiguous	 about	 the	 connection	









people,	 the	 larger	 town	 can	 provide	
police	 protection	 at	 a	 lower	 cost	 per	
person.
	 On	the	other	hand,	large	govern-
ments	 may	 behave	 as	 monopolists,	






alternative	 system	 of	 many	 compet-
ing,	 smaller-sized	 governments	 might	





	 Adding	 to	 the	 confusion,	 shoe-
horning	a	mass	of	autonomous	munic-
ipalities	into	a	limited	space	may	bring	
out	 the	 worst	 in	 decision	 makers,	
encouraging	them	to	behave	strategi-
cally—free	 riding	 on	 the	 benefits	 of	
adjacent	towns’	public	services	or	shift-
ing	the	costs	of	their	own	activities	to	
their	 neighbors.	 	 A	 town	 might	 site	
a	 shopping	 center	 on	 its	 border,	 for	
Economic theory is 
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regional	 consolidation	 or	 some	 other	
system	 of	 shared	 service	 provision	
might	 enhance	 efficiency	 and	 lower	
costs	reduces	to	an	empirical	question.	
All THINGS CONSIDERED
	 According	 to	 data	 from	 the	
Connecticut	 Office	 of	 Policy	 and	
Management	 (OPM),	 2006	 per-cap-
ita	 spending	 on	 local	 public	 servic-
es	 ranged	 from	 a	 low	 of	 $1,534	 in	
Mansfield	(a	figure	no	doubt	skewed	
by	the	large	UConn	student	popula-
tion),	 to	 a	 high	 of	 more	 than	 thrice	
that	 amount—$5,526	 in	 Westport.	 	
University	 students	 notwithstanding,	
spending	 tends	 to	 be	 lower	 in	 the	
northeast	 corner	 of	 Connecticut	 and	
higher	 in	 the	 southwest	 part	 of	 the	
state.
	 OPM	 breaks	 town	 expenditures	
into	two	broad	categories:	education-
al	 spending	 (accounting	 for	 60%	 of	
municipal	 budgets)	 and	 non-educa-
tional	spending	(for	public	works,	safe-
ty,	 and	 other	 services),	 which	 makes	
up	 the	 balance.	 Per-pupil	 education-
al	 spending	 varied	 from	 $8,163	 in	
Watertown	to	$16,135	in	Canaan	(see	
Centerfold	map	on	p.	12)—a	differ-
ence	 of	 nearly	 $8,000—while	 non-




	 Why	 the	 wide	 divergence?	 	 One	
obvious	source	of	variation	is	the	cost	
of	factor	inputs.		Higher	rents,	wages	
and	 capital	 costs	 will	 make	 public	
services	more	expensive.		The	quality	
of	public	services	matters,	too.		Better	
schools	 and	 a	 wider	 variety	 of	 recre-
ational	amenities	do	not	come	cheap.	
Other	characteristics	of	the	population	
likely	 play	 a	 role.	 	 Youngsters	 com-









quality,	 and	 other	 community	 char-
acteristics,	 larger	 towns	 are	 expected	
to	spend	less	on	public	services	than	
smaller	 towns	 because	 they	 can	 pro-
duce	 those	 services	 at	 a	 lower	 unit	
cost.		In	economic	terms,	towns	face	



















number	 of	 rooms	 (a	 measure	 of	 the	
price	of	building	space)	and	per-capita	
debt	burdens	as	a	proxy	for	input	costs.	 	
Percent	 of	 households	 headed	 by	 a	






	 The	 education	 regression	 yielded	
significant	 coefficients,	 opposite	 in	
sign,	 on	 the	 two	 enrollment	 terms:	
negative	on	the	enrollment	term	itself,	





Since	 mean	 student	 enrollment	 per	
town	 was	 only	 3,347	 in	 2006,	 the	
average	school	system	would	need	to	
more	 than	 double	 its	 present	 size	 to	
fully	 capture	 scale	 economies.	 	 And	
the	 payoff	 could	 be	 sizeable.	 	 The	




Thus,	 increasing	 district	 enrollments	
through	 consolidations	 would	 likely	
lower	costs.
	 Per-student	education	cost	is	also	
associated	 with	 the	 education	 qual-
ity	of	adjoining	towns.		Towns	whose	
neighbors	have	large	class	sizes	tend	to	
have	 lower	 costs	 of	 education,	 likely	
the	result	not	of	a	causal	link	but	of	
















the	 other	 independent	 variables	 were	






values	 across	 the	 state	 translates	 into	
a	 difference	 of	 $5,300	 in	 per-pupil	
spending,	 while	 the	 town	 with	 the	
highest	 debt	 burden	 spends	 an	 esti-
mated	$2,200	less	than	the	one	least-
burdened	by	debt.		Perhaps	the	high	
debt	 loads	 reflect	 earlier	 investments	
in	efficiency-enhancing	buildings	and	
equipment.		Towns	with	larger	shares	
of	 female-headed	 households	 and	
adults	with	college	degrees	also	spend	
more	per	student	on	education.		
SECOND VERSE, DIffERENT 
fROM THE fIRST




population,	 since	 all	 residents	 share	
these	services),	and	other	explanatory	
variables	 (see	 second	 graph).	 	 Here,	
the	estimated	coefficient	on	the	output	
term,	 population	 served,	 is	 positive	
and	significant,	but	that	for	population	
squared	(to	allow	for	nonlinearities)	is	
not	 significant.	 For	 non-educational	
services,	unit	costs	appear	to	rise	steadi-
ly	with	output,	unlike	educational	ser-
vices.	 	 Thus,	 expanding	 the	 scale	 of	
government	non-education	services	is	
unlikely	 to	 generate	 any	 significant	
cost	 savings,	 and	 may	 actually	 make	
public	services	more	expensive.
	 And	 unlike	 educational	 services,	
which	show	evidence	of	a	positive	asso-
ciation	 between	 output	 in	 one	 town	
and	 output	 (and	 cost)	 in	 adjacent	
jurisdictions,	non-educational	services	
exhibit	 signs	 of	 a	 negative	 spillover	
effect.	Per	unit	costs	are	inversely	relat-
ed	to	average	library	books	per	capita	
(a	 proxy	 for	 non-educational	 public	
service	 quality)	 in	 surrounding	 com-




based	 on	 the	 difference	 between	 the	




the	 education	 service	 model,	 exert	 a	
similar	 influence	 on	 non-educational	
service	 spending.	 	 Higher	 debt	 levels	
added	to	rather	than	reduced	non-edu-
cational	expenditures,	perhaps	because	
excessive	 borrowing	 weakened	 cred-
itworthiness	 and	 raised	 the	 cost	 of	
capital.	 	 And	 in	 this	 model	 median	
age,	 rather	 than	 educational	 attain-
ment,	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 a	 significant	



































































































SOURCE: The Connecticut Economy
Municipal consolidation or 
other service-sharing plans 
offer no silver bullet for 
the problem of costly local 
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of	business	property	on	the	grand	list	
also	spent	more	per	capita	on	public	
services,	 presumably	 to	 provide	 the	
necessary	infrastructure	that	commer-
cial	activities	require.












lower	 grades.	 	 The	 fact	 that	 more	
municipalities	do	not	forge	such	part-
nerships	 may	 reflect	 dimly-perceived	
benefits	of	cooperation,	an	inability	to	
negotiate	or	police	the	terms	of	an	alli-





programs,	 the	 resulting	 inefficiency	
can	be	viewed	as	the	price	residents	are	
willing	to	pay	for	such	autonomy.







in	 these	 areas,	 and	 the	 cost	 savings	
are	already	reflected	in	the	data.		In	
the	 Hartford	 area,	 for	 example,	 the	
Metropolitan	 District	 Commission	
provides	 water	 and	 sewer	 service	 to	





















		 One	 way	 regionalism	 might	





don’t	 always	 overlap.	 	 A	 municipal	
library	 may	 restrict	 borrowing	 privi-
leges	 to	 local	 residents,	 for	 example,	
but	 it	 probably	 can’t	 completely	 bar	
(either	 de  jure	 or	 de  facto)	 out-of-
towner	 access	 to	 other	 conveniences	
such	 as	 public	 reading	 rooms,	 rest-
rooms,	or	WiFi	Internet.		Where	free	
riding	 occurs,	 however,	 towns	 have	
the	incentive	to	under-provide	public	
services.		In	Connecticut’s	case	these	




	 Connecticut’s	 long	 and	 strong	








Coefficient values measure the change in per pupil spending (left table) and per cap-
ita non-educational spending (right table) associated with a one-unit change in each 
independent variable listed.  The p-values are estimates of the likelihood that these 







Books per Capita 34.49757 0.00
Grand List,
Business Share 6.003583 0.11
Room Value 0.013907 0.00
Female-Headed
Households 25.07708 0.01









Class Size -323.181 0.00
Computers
per Student 1663.339 0.01
Room Value 0.053329 0.00
Female-Headed
Households 191.4213 0.00
BA Degrees 35.76427 0.00
Debt-to-Income -7143.167 0.00
Neighbor Class
Size -150.2455 0.01